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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
StATE OF UTAH

CLEARFIELD STATE BANK,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case N o .

vs .

14521

J.G. CONTOS aka JAMES G. CONTOS,
Defendant and
Respondent.
-h-oooOooo

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant
to recover as secured party property owned by and in the possession of the
Defendant, which property was secured by a lawful security agreement executed
by said Defendant, upon default of the terms of a promissory note concurrently
signed by the Defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge
presiding, on January 16th, 1976, at the Municipal Building in Ogden, Utah,
both parties represented by their respective counsel of record.

Upon receiving

competent evidence and testimony, hearing arguments of both counsel, and being
advised in the premises, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde issued a memorandum
decision dated 18th day of February, 1976, ordering Judgment for the Defendant,
no cause of action.

-2RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant, CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, seeks a reversal of the
dismissal and asks the above entitled court to amend the case to the lower
court for necessary discovery and new trial,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, JAMES G. CONTOS, aka J. G. CONTOS, hereinafter referred
to as CONTOS, a person experienced in the finance business, obtained a loan
from the plaintiff, CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, and executed a promissory note
and security agreement.

The security agreement was properly filed with the

Secretary of the State of Utah.

CONTOS then filed bankruptcy and a disclaimer

was granted to the appellant based upon the security agreement and its filing.
Appellant attempted to pick up the secured property, but was not permitted
to do so by the respondent, resulting in the necessity of bringing this
action.

CONTOS1 wife did not sign any of the documents, nor is she a party

to this law suit.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE SECURED PROPERTY.
The respondent, CONTOS, executed the security agreement wherein it
specifically stated "6. OWNERSHIP - Debtor has or forthwith will acquire
clear title to the collateral free of all encumbrances and security interests
other than this agreement." He should not now be entitled to defeat that
provision regarding ownership by stating that his wife had or has some
undefined position or interest in the property.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not require ownership of the collateral
by the Debtor.

The situation where the collateral is not owned by the debtor

is set forth in UCA 70A-9-112 which states:

-3f,

Where collateral is not owned by debtor. - Unless otherwise agreed
when a secured party knows that collateral is owned by a person who
is not the debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to receive
from the secured party any surplus under section 70A-9-502(2) or under
section 70A-9-504(l), and is not liable for the debt or for any deficiency
after resale, and he has the same right as the debtor."
(a) to receive statements under section 70A-9-208;
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a secured party's proposal
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness
under section 70A-9-905;
(c) to redeem the collateral under section 70A-9-506;
(d) to obtain injunctive or other relief under section 70A-9-507
(i);
and
(e) to recover losses caused to him under section 70A-9-208(2).
The appellant is certainly not attempting to obtain a deficiency
against Mrs. CONTOS.

If the Court found that she did have an interest,

which would be contrary to her husband's quarantee, and contrary to the
Court's jurisdiction since she has not entered the lawsuit, I l m certain that
appellant would comply with the provisions (a) through (e).
Even if the appellant knew that the wife was the owner, which again
was contrary to Mr. CONTOS' representations, it is entitled to the property
though again, not a deficiency.

See the comments in Andersons Secured

Transactions 9-112:4, which states:

"Unless otherwise agreed, when the secured

party knows that the owner of the collateral is not the debtor, such owner is
not personally liable for the debt or for any deficiency after resale."
The appellant retains its priority in the secured property.

Mrs. CONTOS

did not and has not filed any documents reflecting that she has any ownership
interest.

The priority of the appellant as set forth in UCA 70A-9-301 is

still in effect.

Even if there is a sale, exchange or other disposition

of the property, the appellant retains its security interest as provided in
UCA 70A-9-306(2) which states:

-4"Except where this chapter otherwise provides, a security interest
continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other
disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized
by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections
received by the debtor.!f
In 69 Am Jur 2d 458, Secured Transactions, it sets forth:
"If the agreement does not give the debtor the power of sale,
the debtor may nevertheless transfer his rights in the collateral.
However, with certain exceptions, collateral sold by the debtor
remains subject to a perfected security interest."
A finding by this Court that respondent is entitled to the secured
property would effectively change the priorities as established by the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Court.

Thus, if the appellantfs

security agreement is not effective, then the property involved should
have gone to the Trustee in Bankruptcy for distribution to the creditors of
the bankrupt.
If, in fact, Mrs. Contos has an interest in the property and if, the
respondent, CONTOS, improperly pledged such interest, then she has the
right to bring wuch claim against him.

His representations that she has

some interest should not be permitted to defeat the plaintifffs claim.
A finding by this Court that respondent is entitled to the secured
property will open the door for fraud against secured creditors.

Borrowers

could pledge property, guarantee ownership, then after filing bankruptcy,
claim it belonged to someone else, and refuse to turn it over to the secured
creditor.

As in this case, by the time it may be determined that the borrower

may not have a complete interest in the property, it is too late to reopen
the discharged bandruptcy case.

The secured creditor has the further

dilemma

that if the Bankruptcy Court found against the secured creditor, then he loses
the property.

The end result would be that lenders would be required to observe

all items of collateral and someway through documents of ownership; have tho
title insured - an impossible burden for all parties.

-5The respondent should not be entitled to benefit by his own fraud.
A finding by the Court that respondent is entitled to the secured property
will result in that precise result.
The respondent received the loan and used the proceeds for the benefit
of his wife and himself, pledging the furniture which he then claimed he
owned, but now claims that the wife has some undefinable interest. There
were no third parties; the husband-wife team should not be permitted to
retain the loan proceeds and the pledged property.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellant respectfully petitions the court
to reverse the dismissal entered by the lower court and grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

fj6^^

day of August, 1976.

T..RL T. SftfTH
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f

- Appellant
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